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ARGUMENTI
THE PROSECUTION HAD A DUTY TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT WITH A LIST OF
ALL ANTICIPATED WITNESSES PRIOR TO TRIAL.
The trial court ruled that the testimony of Mr. Gonzales was admissable because there was
no specific request for witnesses in the file. (Trial transcript, Page 66). The City does not address
the propriety of the trial court's reasoning but instead concedes that the governing case is State v.
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987), and that the defense had no obligation to make a specific
written request for witnesses. The issue thus turns on the factual issue as to whether the list of
witnesses was in feet in the file, and whether this list was provided to defense counsel
The City alleges in its Appellee Brief that Ms. Patton had free access to the file and plenty
of opportunity to view the cover sheet with the list of witnesses that was allegedly stapled into the
file (Appellee's Brie£ page 8). In feet, each time die went to the city attorney's office to view the
file, she was shown only that portion of the file that was approved by the city attorney prior to her
viewing the file. The file as it was presented to Ms. Patton did not contain any witness Hst. Ms.
Patton requested a copy of the file, and this was promptly done, but the copy of the file provided
by the City to Ms. Patton contained no witness list. At the same time, based on the City's
representations, Ms. Patton had no reason whatsoever to suspect that she had received anything
less than the complete file. This, of course, is precisely the situation set forth in Salt Lake City v.
Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1993), as cited in Appellant's Brief on page 8. In that
case as in this, the city failed to completely respond to the defendant's discovery request, but also
-1-

foiled to inform the defense that it was refusing to provide all requested information. The defense
did not attempt to compel discovery because the prosecution's conduct had misled them to
believe they had no reason to do so.
This same principal appHes as to the City's subsequent argument (Appellee's Brie£ page
9) that Ms. Patton had been provided with a copy of the memo indicating that Mr. Malloy had
been accompanied by Mr. Gonzales. As noted in the Appellant's Brief on page 9, this
memorandum stated that Mr. Malloy, not Mr. Gonzales, took the relevant photographs. And as
already noted there, the response of both Mr. Malloy and Mr. McGinn to the direct question at
pretrial of both Mrs. Patton and Mr.Humiston as to who the city's witnesses would be was very
clear that Mr. Malloy would be the only witness. It is hard to imagine a more direct
misrepresentation by the City. There can thus be no question that the Cityfoiledin its duty to
provide full discovery and not to mislead the defense. This is precisely the situation set forth in
State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987), where the prosecutionfoiledto provide the
defense with all information available, andfoiledto inform the defense that it had produced less
than the full file. Provo City hasfoiledin any way to distinguish that casefromthis one.
ARGUMENT H
THE TRIAL COURT ERROR IN ADMITTING GONZALES' SURPRISE TESTIMONY
SO PREJUDICED DEFENDANT'S CASE AS TO UNDERMINE ALL CONFIDENCE IN
THE VALIDITY OF THE TRIAL AND WARRANTS REVERSAL.
The case law makes clear that the court erred in allowing the testimony of Mr. Gonzales.
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S of the Utah Rules df Fvidenec states:

1 .

At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own
motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person.
(2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its
representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be
essential to the presentation of his cause.
Had Ms. Pattonhad any idea thai tiie City intended to tall any witness nilin tlwii Mi
Malloy, she would have invoked the exclusion of witnesses under this rule, as sh^ L~~ ~
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We hold that when a court fails to comply with Rule 615, prejudice is presumed
and reversal is required unless it is manifestly clearfromthe record that the error was
harmless or unless the prosecution proves harmless error by a preponderance of the
evidence." 718 F.2d at 293-294.
Provo City cannot now argue that it is manifestly clearfromthe record that the error was
harmless. Having heard every word of Mr. Malloy's testimony, Mr. Gonzales had every
opportunity to tailor his testimony to compensate for any shortcomings in Mr. Malloy's
testimony. Subsequent examination of the file indicated that some of Mr. Gonzales' statements
directly contradicted the written materials (e.g. that Gonzales, rather than Malloy, had taken the
photographs; Appellants Brie£ page 9). Since there was no opportunity to prepare for Mr.
Gonzales, there was no reasonable way that these contradictions could be brought to the court's
attention on cross-examination.
Case law on the exclusionary rule is relevant, inasmuch as Ms. Patton was in effect misled
into waiving herrightsunder Rule 615. This only serves to emphasize the larger issue, however,
that by failing to provide the witness list in discovery, the City clearly prejudiced Ms. Patton's
defense. As set forth in the Appellant's brief (Appellant's Brie£ page 11), an error on the part of
the prosecution puts the burden of proof on the prosecution to show that the error was harmless
State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). This the City has failed to do.
Mr. Gonzales' testimony clearly carried more weight than that of the other two witnesses.
It is true that Mr. Malloy testified in vague terms as to junk, and that Mr. Keller testified that the
Patton's home was consistent with the general character of the neighborhood. However, the
-4-

judges opinion (Trial transcript, pages 115-116, Appellee's brie£ page 5) makes it clear that his
ruling was based on thefindingthat there was "stored trash, scraps of wood, deteriorated
cardboard boxes", etc. in the yard. Although the court declared that it relied on the testimony of
all three witnesses to reach this conclusion, the prosecution only cited the testimony of Mr.
Gonzales in making itsfinalargument regarding lumber, food, and boxes (Trial transcript, pages
109,113). The fact that the court attributed to all three witnesses matters that were only testified
to specifically by Mr. Gonzales clearly shows that the judge could not distinguish between the
three, and Mr. Gonzales5 testimony was clearly prejudicial
While the court may have relied on the testimony of Mr. Malloy and Mr. Keller to
corroborate itsfinding,his specific ruling could not stand on the testimony of either of these men
alone. Mr. Keller simply did not testify at any point that trash existed in the Patton's yard. He
testified only that their yard was consistent with others. He testified that some of those others had
trailers (which the court specifically did notfindin the Pattons' case), some had weeds (which the
court made no mention of in the Pattons' case), and some had piles of rocks (which nobody
alleged existed in die Pattons' yard). He specifically stated that a neighbor had cardboard boxes,
but only Mr. Gonzales testified as to boxes in the Pattons' yard. Nothing in Mr. Keller's
testimony implicated the Patton's except to the extent that the court interpreted it to corroborate
Mr. Gonzales' testimony. Had Mr. Keller's testimony been the sole testimony, there simply
would not have been enough evidence to convict. Indeed, had the bulk of Mr. Keller's intended
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testimony not been excluded by the court, it would have established that the City was estopped
from charging Ms. Patton under the ordinance, as discussed further below.
Mr. Malloy testified at length about vehicles on the property and a fence. The court did
not find a violation as to either of those matters. As stated in Appellant's Brie£ Mr. Malloy was
repeatedly questioned as to other items in the yard, and repeatedly replied that he "could not
remember specifics". (Trial transcript, pages 24, 44-45, 62). He did testify as to "equipment or
parts generally" (Trial transcript, page 51), yet the judge made no suchfindingin hisfinalruling.
Indeed the only portions of Mr. Malloy's testimony which the court incorporated into its final
ruling were those which corroborated Mr. Gonzales' statements. In contrast, Mr. Gonzales'
testimony appears to have been accepted in its entirety, and it appears to form the central basis for
the court's ruling. It is clear that the testimony of other witnesses was only relied on by the court
to corroborate Mr. Gonzales' testimony, but there is no clear evidence that the court would have
found the same based on their testimony alone, and the City cannot convincingly prove such from
the record. The City has failed to meet its burden of proof as to harmless error, and the ruling of
the trial court must be reversed.
ARGUMENT m
THE DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT TO RELY ON THE STANDARD OF
ENFORCEMENT SET BY A COMPETENT COURT IN PRIOR CASES.
The whole of the Appellee's argument with respect to the issue of a prior standard of
enforcement is that the defendant's brief did not comply with the Rules of Procedure and
-6-

therefore the Court should decline to address the issues. (Under the equitable principle that those
who seek equity must do equity, it should be noted that the Appellee's Brief in this matter was
ffled over a month after its due date, and was accepted only by leave of the court, over the
Appellant's ffled objection.) More importantly, however, the issue was clearly raised at trial and
preserved for appeal, as set forth on pages 84-86 of the transcript.
Ms. Patton attempted at several times throughout the trial to raise the issue of collateral
estoppel, including through the testimony of Brent Keller. Every time she did so, the court
ordered the matter excluded. See Trial transcript, pages 42, 53, 90-93, 97-98. Sentencing
transcript, pages 12-13,
In the trial transcript, page 56, Officer Malloy states,
'"Because there had been previous work on it, I did browse through the existing
file, but did not use the material in there. I went out to the site and saw an existing
violation and proceeded with my action..."
Mr. Malloy raised the issue himself that there had been previous action on the case, and
that he disregarded the established file. Had Ms. Patton been permitted to present all her
evidence, it would have clearly established that a standard of compliance had already been set in
previous cases, and that notwithstanding Mr. Malloy's subjective determination, or even Mr.
Gonzales' questionable testimony, she was in feet in compliance with the standard previously set
by the court and the City in her particular case. This very issue was raised at trial (Trial
transcript, pages 84-86) Mr. Malloy, a relatively new zoning officer, was handed an existing file
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of previous violations and actions taken by the city, but failed to take into account the standard of
compliance set by those previous cases.
The elements of collateral estoppel are that: (1) The issue decided in the prior abjudication
must be identical to the one presented in the action in question; (2) there must be afinaljudgment
on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted must be a party in privity with a
party to the prior abjudication; and (4) the issue in thefirstaction must be completely, fully, and
fairly litigated. Career Service Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections. 942 P.2d 933,
938 (Utah 1997). hi 1993 Ms. Patton was also charged and convicted of having trash in her yard.
In the Fall of 1994, at Ms. Patton's invitation, Skip Tandy of Provo City Zoning, Brent Keller and
Stan Egan inspected the premises (Trial transcript, page 89). At that time Mr. Tandy in his
capacity as an officer of Provo City declared that the property had improved considerably since
trial and at that time (1994) was completely in compliance. Had he been permitted to testify, Mr.
Keller would have attested to these facts, that he had seen the property three times since the prior
abjudication (Trial transcript, page 88) and that it was in even better condition each time. The
City thus set a standard of compliance, and Ms. Patton relied on that standard to her detriment in
expending effort to improve the premises above and beyond that standard. Ms. Patton was
entitled to present evidence to that effect to establish that the City was estopped from further
enforcement inconsistent with the existing standard. She was prevented from doing this when the
court excluded the relevant evidence. This was an error of law on the part of the trial court, Ms.
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Patton was severely prejudiced thereby, and the verdict of the court should therefore be reversed.

rv
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF A COURTESTABLISHED STANDARD OF ENFORCEMENT
Utah law is clear that enforcement of a zoning ordinance can be enjoined if there is
discriminatory enforcement. Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136,140 (Utah 1976). In
Kartchner the court found that wiiere there were six violations similar to those charged against the
defendant in the same neighborhood, yet no enforcement against the other six, there was clearly
discriminatory enforcement. "The discriminatory manner in which the ordinance has been
enforced by plaintiff is sufficient ground to deny equitable relief" Kartchner. 552 P.2d at 140.
Ms. Patton attempted to present considerable evidence of discriminatory enforcement by
Provo City. The court refiised to accept exhibits to this eflFect and refused to allow Mr. Keller to
testify as to most of these matters, and notwithstanding Mr. Keller's observations regarding
similar violations against which the City had taken no action, the court made the erroneous
observation that there had been no evidence presented of discriminatory enforcement (Trial
transcript, page 97,116,119). The court erred in both excluding the relevant exhibits and the
further testimony of Mr. Keller, and in overlooking his testimony as to discriminatory
enforcement. Ms. Patton's was thus denied her full defense, and the verdict should therefore be
reversed.

-9-

CONCLUSION
There can be no question that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Roger
Gonzales. This error not only created a presumption of prejudice, but did infeetprejudice the
defense. The City cannot establish that the error in admitting Mr. Gonzales' testimony was
harmless, and cannot overcome the presumption of prejudice. It is also clear that City was
estopped from enforcement of the ordinance through its previous actions, and the court clearly
erred in excluding testimony that would have established this feet. Likewise, the court erred in
excluding and disregarding evidence of discriminatory enforcement, a defense available to the
Defendant under Utah law. Defendant Joan Patton's conviction of violating Provo City
Ordinance 14.34.080 should therefore be reversed and remanded for a new triaL
DATED this 15th day of June, 1998.

Jjpau J. Patton
Appellant pro se

v

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that 2 copies of the attached Appellant's Reply Brief were mailed to Lisa
Peterson, Assistant Provo City Attorney, 359 West Center St., Provo, UT 84601, this 15* day of
June, 1998.
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ADDENDUM
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24

here today when you're testifying, would you please
just refer all your comments to the violation that
exists on this lot, and violations on any other lot
will be saved for another day?
A.

I will.

Q.

Thank you, would you please take the stand

again.
(Witness resumes stand)
Now the lot at 1067 North 750 West, as whac
you've described on the board, showing a residence and
a parking pad, correct?
A.

It is.

Q.

In that front yard area what types of

materials did you see on that day that you felt were a
violation of 14-34-080?
A.

I do not recall specifics, but there were

numerous violations on that lot.

In addition to the

trailer, that is the most obvious or most apparent
violation when you first look at the lot.
Q.

Do you remember in general what cypes of

materials were on that?
A.

There were lumber and other debris. He had

things that I would see as just being trash that I
would remove from a lot, but I do not recall the
specifics.

42

part of what you said.
Q.

Would the City have any enforced its

authority and right under the probation to bring the
property into compliance at defendants' expense had
she not brought it into compliance?
A.

What probation?

Q.

Any probation.

As an example, this type, if

nothing was brought into compliance, then would the
City enforce its right to say, "Take the trailer, take
the fence down?"
A.

I believe that that is what we have

requested of you to either move the vehicle to another
place on the lot or remove it from the lot to comply
with Section 14-34-080.
Q.

But the vehicle had been removed under

(inaudible) defendants' last guilty verdict by the
City if the vehicle was not in compliance at that
time?
THE COURT:

Ms. Patton, I don't have an

objection, but I'm going to sustain it anyway.
My objection is that we are not here to
discuss matters of prior hearings and any rulings with
respect to whether there was a guilty or not guilty
verdict, as you've characterized it.
into those.

Please don't get

44

A.

Should I read that?

Q.

You're welcome to.

A.

"No trash, used materials, junk, household

furniture, appliances, scrap material, equipment or
parts thereof shall be stored in an open area. The
accumulation of more than one such item constitutes a
junk yard as defined in Chapter 14-06, Provo City
Code, and must be removed from the property, stored
within an enclosed building, or be properly located in
an M-2 zone.n
Because I have not been on the subject lot,
I do not know what is in the backyard area. There is
a sign, as I've described before, that prohibits me
from going on the site to determine what is in the
backyard.

Because I have not been on the site nor

seen what's in the backyard I cannot answer that
adequately in response to your question.
Q.

Does the yard have trash on it?

A.

I'm sorry, what's that?

Q.

Does the yard have trash on it?

A.

As I just said, I cannot determine what's in

the backyard area because I have not been-Q.

On what you have seen.

A.

In the front yard area I have not seen it as

today's date. On March 19, 1996, however, there was

45

1

other materials that I referenced by sub section 3.

2

There were materials in the yard area.

3

Q.

Does the yard have used materials in it?

4

A.

When?

5

THE COURT:

We're talking about 3/19/96?

6

MS. PATTON:

7

THE WITNESS:

Uh-huh, that's correct.
Yes, there were at that point

8

in time materials in the front yard area.

9

not know what was in the backyard area.

10

Q.

11

BY MS. PATTON:

Again, I do

Is the term "used material"

defined in the Provo City Code?

12

A.

I'm not aware of whether it is or not.

Q.

Is the term "used material" defined in the

13

I

14

| state code?

15

A.

I'm not sure whether it is or not.

16

Q.

Is the term "used material" defined in the

17

department's policy and procedure?

13

A.

I'm not sure whether it is or not.

19

Q.

Does the term relate to items used in

20

building structures?

21

A.

Does the term or does the ordinance?

22

Q.

Does the term (inaudible) the word material?

23

A.

It may well refer to materials used for

24

construction.

25

Q.

Does the term relate to previously utilized

51

A.

In some ways, yes, it is.

Q.

Does the yard have equipment or parts

thereof on it?
A.

Equipment or parts generally?

From what I

could see in the front yard area I would say yes,
under that general term.

Again, in the backyard I

have no idea whether or not there was those materials,
even though the ordinance does reference any open
area.

Because of physical limitations I could not see

what was in the backyard.
Q.

Is the term "equipment" defined in Provo

City Code?
Q.

Is the term "equipment" defined in Utah

State Code?
A.

I'm not sure whether it is or not.

Q.

Is the term "equipment" defined in the

department's policy and procedure?
A.

I'm not sure whether it is or not.

Q.

Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning

officer as to whether objects are equipment?
A.

Whether what?

Q.

Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning

officer as to whether objects are equipment?
A.

Again, other than common sense of being able

to identify whether an object is equipment or not, it

53

speaking about what-if's.

In this specific situation

it is not enclosed, it is an open area in the front
yard.
Q.

Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning

officer as to whether an area within a fence -private yard is an open area?
A.

This ordinance says that the junk needs to

be inside of a building, so anything that's not inside
of a building would be an open area.
Q.

Has the defendant ever been charged with

violations of Provo City Ordinances before now?
MR. MCGINN:
THE COURT:
Q.

Objection, your Honor.
Sustained.

BY MS. PATTON:

When you first started

working for the zoning department approximately 17
months ago, were you handed an open file on Joan
Patton?
A.

I do not recall whether it was open or not.

I was given the file, though.
Q.

Of which you have been in (inaudible) up

through this 17 months?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Do you have any idea how old the fence is in

question?
A.

The fence on the subject lot?

56

1

a citizen complaint?

2

A.

I had received and have received several

3

calls from concerned residents in regards to your

4

property.

5

I

Q.

And who would those residents be?

6

I

A.

I don't have that information in front of

8

Q.

But you do have it on file?

9

A.

That is correct.

10

Q.

Was a charge levied against this property

7

me.

11

because it had deteriorated to a level that existed at

12

the time prior to the charge?

13

A.

I cannot really answer that.

When I started

14

with the City I was given numerous cases and asked to

15

investigate those, and one such case was your

16

property.

17

I did browse through the existing file, but did not

18

use the material in there.

19

saw an existing violation and proceeded with my action

20

as of that date in contacting you and requesting that

21

the property be brought into compliance.

22

Because there had been previous work on it

MS. PATTON:

I went out to the site and

I have no more questions for

23

the witness at this time, your Honor, but would like

24

to reserve the right to inquire the witness further.

25

THE COURT:

You may.

62

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MCGINN:
Q.

Officer Malloy, forget about the trailer,

forget about the trailer right now on this piece of
property that we're talking about.
there.

Forget it's not

On that day we're there, on March 19, 1996,

was there scrap material, junk, garbage, trash in the
front yard area constituting a violation?
A.

There were.

Q.

Is it possible that two different zoning

officers could ever at one time go out to a piece of
property and one officer miss a violation?
A.

I would say that would be unlikely, but it

could happen.
MR. MCGINN:
THE COURT:

No further questions.
You may step down.

May I see the exhibits, please?
them right there?

Do you have

Thank you.

Call your next witness, will you, please?
MR. MCGINN:
THE COURT:

Mr. Roger Gonzalez.
Before Mr. Gonzalez testifies,

Mr. Schriner and Mr. Means?
Ms. Patton, is there a problem?
MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:

Yes, I object, your Honor.
Object to what?

63

MS. PATT0N:

I asked him discovery who the

witnesses would be, and Mr. Malloy said that they had
no witnesses, your Honor.
THE COURT:
MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:

Well, let me address-Mr. McGinn, pardon me.
Let me address that in a minute.

Why don't you have a seat.
Before we call the next witness, the case
that was on before you folks has been resolved for
some time.

I want: to dispose of it now so that these

folks can go on their way.
(Short recess taken)
THE COURT: Thank you, folks,,, for the
interruption.
Now Mr. McGinn, you were calling another
witness?
MR. MCGINN:

Yes, your Honor, Roger

Gonzalez, and I believe they were objecting.
THE COURT: Ms. Patton, you had an
objection.

State your objection, will you, please?

MS. PATTON:

I did not receive any discovery

that Mr. Gonzalez was going to be a witness, therefore
I have not had a chance to prepare.
THE COURT:

1 didn't soe any scheduling

order that said identification of witnesses.

64

Mr. McGinn?
MR. MCGINN:

Your Honor, if I could respond

to that.
THE COURT:
MR. MCGINN:

Go ahead.
Joan Pat ton has come into

office several times. Our office has an open file
policy.

I believe Mr. Humiston, I believe also, has

come in and asked for discovery.

In our office if --

and to show them, in our file -- if they come in we'll
allow them to look at the file, or we just make copies
of everything that's in the file.

We give everybody

everything, there should be no secrets, that's our
office policy and that's what we do.
With that, I know as Joan Patton has come in
several times, we do have a cover sheet.

It has a

list of our officers that says, "Anthony Malloy, Roger
Gonzalez from the zoning department."

Anytime they

come in and take a look that's there, and those are
the orders that we give for them for people who-THE COURT:

When did the defendants first

become aware of the name of Roger Gonzalez associated
in this charge?
MS. PATTON:

Just now, your Honor.

MR. HUMISTON:

Your Honor, every document in

this file was provided to me in discovery except the

one that Mr. McGinn is referring to. This is the
first we've heard about Mr. Gonzalez.
I appreciate they do have an open file
policy and (inaudible) very generous, but this issue
has come up and we also find out for the first time
that there were neighbor complaints, which issue was
specifically addressed at the time of pre-trial.

So

I'm getting the impression that the open file policy
has been less than entirely open.
MR. MCGINN:

They've had access to

everything I have and more.

Joan's called me and

asked me for -- or Ms. Patton has called me and asked
me for files that community development's had that
I've not had in my possession, given those files to
her, she's been free to go through it.
THE COURT

WPII,

there's nothing contained

in the files with respect to identification of
witnesses on either side -- objection to witnesses
identification or objection to exhibits

That means

everything's been done informally.
MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:
MS. PATTON:

Can I be heard, your Honor?
Sure.
The motion for the bill of

particulars, which we've had a hearing on, I did
specifically at that time ask for a witness list and

66

have not to this date been given a witness list, your
Honor, and I do not dispute what Mr. Malloy has
said -- or Mr. McGinn, I'm sorry.
I did in fact see everything that was in
that file except for the top page that I have just now
seen.
MR. MCGINN:

If I may approach just to show

the Court-THE COURT:

Just a moment.

Would you point

out for me, please, where in your bill of particulars
you ask for identification of witnesses?
MS. PATTON:

I did it verbally, your Honor,

before Judge Howard, in which I don't have a
transcript.
THE COURT:

I have your bill of particulars

and I have your memorandum in support of your bill of
particulars, and there is nothing by way of any
request for witnesses.

I'm going to deny your

objection.
Mr. Gonzalez?
COURT CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the

testimony you are about to give in this case now
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS:

I do.

MR. HUMISTON:
Honor.

I do understand that, your

However, based on that a lot of the -- our

preparations is based on what the source of the
information were, and representations made by Mr.
Malloy himself there were in fact no such witnesses.
Had we had that information --we <iioii't know, because
it was not provided to us.

It could have made a

difference - - a substantial difference in how our
defense would have been prepared, what

lesses we

might have brought.
Again,

's speculation at this point

because we don't have that information, but: we do teel
it was very relevant.
THE COURT:

How would your defense be

different if there's not going to be any testimony
from neighbor witnesses?

If there's not going to be

any and we're not treat, inq any evidence from anyone,
then there's nothing to address.
MR. HUMISTON:

One of the issues that has

been of great concern to us has been the fact that
there is an open file being maintained on Mrs. Patton,
that chis is been in court now -- this is the fourth
prosecution that's been brought against her, and that
some of the issues being raised in this were issues
that could have been raised in the previous
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prosecution.
A lot of what's relevant to that is who is
initiating these, where is it coming from?

Our

information up 'til today was that in fact the City,
on its on initiative, had initiated these things
without any complaints from neighbors, without any
input whatsoever.
From our position it would change the
posture of the case a great deal had we known that
there were in fact neighbors involved, if there were
in fact neighbors involved.

We're a little confused

now because Mr. Malloy has represented just the
opposite to us earlier.
THE COURT:

The City's case will rise or

fall depending upon the testimony of Anthony Malloy
and Roger Gonzalez.

So I'll deny your motion with

respect to issues concerning phantom neighbors. They
have no impact with me here.
MR. HUMISTON:

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Do you want to make an opening

statement, Mr. Humiston?

Do you want to do it before

Ms. Patton does her case or after her?
MS. PATTON:

I just have one more thing and

then I'm done.
MR. HUMISTON:

Your Honor, I'd just like to

1

make a brief statement, and I've already alluded to

2

this, is that -- this is, for the Court's information,

3

the fourth prosecution that has been brought against

4

Mrs. Patton.

5

of, if nothing else, estoppel.

6

fence - - o f course, the fence charge has been dropped,

7

but we feel that, there's some other element here

8

involved, and (inaudible) simply violations, and we'd

9

like to -- we'll present that (inaudible) argument as

10

We feel that there are serious issues
We're talking about a

far as what's been going on here.

11

I'll let Ms. Patton proceed with her case.

12

THE COURT:

13

MS. Patton,, call your first witness, will

14

Okay.

Thank you, sir.

you, pi ease?

15

MS. PATTON:

16

THE COURT:

17

COURT CLERK:

Defense calls Brent Keller.
Mr

Keller?
You do solemnly sv/ear that the

18

testimony you are about to give in this case now

19

pending before the Court wi 11 t e the tr utl i, the whole

20

truth, and nothing but. the truth, so help you God?

THE WITNESS:

21
22

///

23

///

24
25

I do.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MS. PATTON:

3
4
5
6
7

What's the date in 1994?
It was one week after my

sentencing with the Court.
THE COURT:

I don't know anything about

sentencing.
MS. PATTON:

I'm sorry.

I your Honor--

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. HUMISTON:

What's the date in 1994?
Could I speak to the

10

relevance of this, your Honor?

11

THE COURT:

12

And here again,

No, I would like to know the

date, please.

13

MS. PATTON:

14

THE COURT:

(inaudible) one moment.
While she is looking for that,

15

Mr. Humiston, I'd be happy to hear from you to respond

16

to the objection.

17

MR. HUMISTON:

Yes, as far as the objection,

18

one of the arguments -- and I speak (inaudible) I have

19

not talked to her as far as (inaudible) but one of the

20

arguments I'm (inaudible) is there is an issue of

21

estoppel here in that some of -- the City has, as I

22

said, prosecuted her three times in the past.

The

23

J issues being raised today have not been raised in the

24

past, and some of these pertain to violations that

25

allegedly --if they are violations today -- may have
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j

been violations at that time.
that time, take any action.

The

r

did not, at

r believe Mr. Keller's

testimony will go to that issue.
Also there is some testimony as tin the
(inaudible) zoning official's approval that the house
was in compliance prior to the prosecution and that in
fact nothing has changed.
Also (inaudible) issue of estoppel, as well
as other issues. So I believe that's where the
relevancy of Mr. Keller's testimony is to prior issues
(inaudible).
THE COURT:

MS. PATTON:

Mr. McGinn?

Give or take a few days, your

Honor, it would have been the week of December 22nd.
MR. MCGINN:

Well, several things.

If he's

going to testify as to the condition of the property
as it was in 1994, and that it looked the same now in
1996, I have no problem with that.

Bi

:f he's going

to testify that Skip Tandy, a zoning officer, said,
"Oh, this property looks great, it's fine," and it's
in the same condition, I'm goi i ig to object to that for
hearsay.
That's an out of court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted that the
property looked the same and was fine, and therefore

if there's some of estoppel going on here for the
City, we can easily file a -- have Skip Tandy brought
into court as a rebuttal witness, and we can have him
testify to everything he did in 1994 and to what the
property looks like, and if he's seen it now, and a
violation.
I think what they want to get it is this
witness saying that a Provo City zoning officer said
it was okay, and I think that's hearsay.
THE COURT: Ms. Patton, do you v/ant to speak
to that?
MS. PATTON:

I'll rephrase the question.

THE COURT: No, no, no.

I haven't ruled on

the objection yet. Do you want to speak to his
response?
Mr. Humiston, do you want to speak to it?
MR. HUMISTON:

Your Honor, if the State

would like to bring in Skip Tandy, and he would
testify to these matters, we would certainly have no
objection to that, although I'm not sure how that puts
us for time today.
THE COURT:

It doesn't put us very good for

today.
I'm going to grant the objection with
respect to testimony as to the condition of the
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property in December of 1994. The question is whether
or not the property was In violation on March 19,
1996.
MR. HUMIST0N:
THE COURT:

May I approach?

Y\>u bet , you sure may.

BY MS. PATT0N:

I would like to ask what the

condition of the properties in the neighborhood that
the defendant resides in, as you would have possiblyseen this morning?
A

The neighborhood — quite frankly, it's not

a neighborhood I would like to live in. There are
numerous trailers with junk in them, there are yards
with piles of lO'.'/ks and debris.

One house in

particular stands out as I went through the
neighborhood last Friday and again today, there's a
carport full of cardboard boxes clear up to the
ceiling.

I couldn't even -- I imagine there were many

dozens of these cardboard boxes, which is about four
houses down from the Patton residence.
A house not too far away, a log house, the
front yard is full of weeds. Many houses in the area
are very similar.

It's an older neighborhood, the

houses aren't well kept, the yards aren't well kept,
they are not immaculate yards that I see in many of
the other parts of Provo.

That's how I'd describe the
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talking about any trailer on the street.

We're

talking about perhaps an inoperable vehicle in the
front yard, or -- and/or we're talking about garbage,
trash, junk, those types of materials in the front
yard.

That's what we're here about, we're not here

about trailers in the streets, whether people have
things parked-MR. HUMISTON:

Maybe we're arguing semantics

here, but by on the street I mean other neighbors on
the street, there are trailers in driveways, trailers
in yards, junk in front of houses.

We have evidence

of all of that, and we are curious as to why the
Pattons are being singled out when I think evidence
would show, relative to some of these other houses,
it's actually quite a bit cleaner.
MR. MCGINN:

My contention is that there has

been no showing of any evidence anywhere that the
Pattons have been singled out.

In cross examination I

thought Officer Malloy said yes, there are other
violations in the area that they're working on.
THE COURT:

I don't have any evidence of

discriminatory enforcement of the Provo City
Ordinances.

The fact that we may have a junky

neighborhood and that the defendant's property
complies with the junky neighborhood, making it junky,

too, doesn't tell me that that's discriminatory
enforcement of the ordinance as to the defendants.
So we've got the testimony from this
gentleman concerning what he's observed in the
neighborhood, and that the defendants' property looks
about the same as everybody else.

I don't think we

need anything else with respect to neighborhood
description.
Count I sets forth the claimed violations of
the defendants with respect to 14-34-080, and that's
what we're -- we are going to proceed under that or
we're not in terms of any finding of violation or no
violation.
MR. HUMISTON:
THE COURT:

So are you sustaining the--

I'm sustaining the objection to

the marking of photographs as exhibits to support the
witness' testimony as to what the neighborhood looked
like.

That's what you wanted to do with them, that's

what she said.
MR. HUMISTON: Yes.
THE COURT: Mrs. Pat ton, are you through
with this gentleman?
MS. PATTONi

T

h&ve no further questions for

the witness as this time, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay,

109

THE COURT:
MR. MCGINN:

Go ahead.
They testified that from that

photo you can't see clearly the interior of the yard,
but Mr. Gonzalez was clear in that he stood on the
sidewalk, looked in the yard, and described the types
of materials; lumber that was in various bits and
pieces, food upon the ground that were not covered,
there was some questions alluding to the fact that
this could have been firewood, but it was not kept -there is no evidence that it was kept in any sort of
manner, there is no evidence that it was used as
firewood.

There was boxes, bags strewn across the

front yard.
They are clearly in violation.
a violation that needs to be addressed.

When there's
If the

property gets cleaned up and in five months there's
another violation, that violation needs to be
addressed.
We think the evidence that has been
presented to the Court is clear.

There's only been

three witnesses, both Officers Malloy and Gonzalez
testified that the yard in question did have junk,
garbage, material, trash.
Mr. Keller for the defense testified --he
testified, that the whole neighborhood --he testified
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this was something he had only found out last week.
So I would submit that as far as the count
that remains, the State has failed to establish a
prima facia case of a violation, and we would rest on
that.
THE COURT:
MR. MCGINN:

Thank you, sir.
Thank you, your Honor.

Subjective to termination, your Honor, terms and
ordinances have their plain and ordinary meaning, and
I understand that some people may consider one man's
garbage is another man's treasure.

But in this case

the evidence was clear there were wood strewn about
the lawn with -- uncovered that had been weathered,
there were paper or cartons -- cardboard cartons thac
were overflowing, splitting, had been left out in the
weather, were in a weathered condition.
I think this clearly under the plain and
ordinary words used in the ordinance, 14-34-080, are
trash, junk, materials that are clearly in the area.
As far as any intent, the officer indicated
that he sent a letter indicating that there was a
violation, the letter came back from Ms. Patton
indicating that she didn't think there was a
violation.
As to the meaning of the vehicle, whether
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All those photographs really show is a
residence with a bunch of material out in front and a
parked trailer.
Mr. Malloy testified that he didn't remember
if the trailer had flat tires on it on March 19th or
not, and he said he had no evidence of whether the
trailer was registered or whether it wasn't.
The second portion of the City's charging
offense contained in Count I is the defendant, also
during the time in question, stored trash, used
materials, junk, household furniture, appliances,
scrap materials, equipment or parts thereof in an open
area not screened from the public streets and adjacent
properties by an opaque wall or fence.
In reading the statute and hearing the
testimony that's been provided by Mr. Malloy and Mr.
Gonzalez, which is the testimony we have, and the
testimony of Mr. Keller that we had a rather
dilapidated neighborhood in which the defendants'
property complied in making it appear to be the same
as the neighborhood in question, I find that the City
has met its burden of proof concerning the second
portion of that charging information in Count I,
therefore I find the defendants guilty as charged.
From the plain and simple meaning of the
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ordinance, so you have your record on appeal, folks, I
believe that the evidence has sufficiently
demonstrated that there are items which consist of
junk, stored trash, scraps of wood, deteriorated
cardboard boxes, and even potential food products that
looked like they had gone bad, from the witness'
testimony.
And with that testimony being the only
testimony on the record, with nothing else to rebut it
or to describe what it was, then the Court has only
one conclusion to draw, and that is is it believable
or is it not, and I find that the City has met its
proof with respect to belief.
The questions that came from the defendant,
Mrs. Patton, was it possible for these things to be
something else.

I guess it's possible that Haley Bob

comet had a spaceship behind it.
not.

Probable?

Probably

It's possible that all of these things were

meant for the burning of firewood?

Possible.

But

from the testimony I have on the record, and I have to
make a finding from the testimony, it's probable that
it was not firewood.

So I find the defendants guilty

as charged in Count I.
What's your pleasure with respect to
sentencing?

You may be sentenced today on each of
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will be bringing charges in the future because they
are not in compliance.
I think it would just be a help to them at
that time -- we're all going to be here anyways, we
can present them with what we think we have, and if we
can't get compliance, the City is going to be forced
to bring charges again against them.
THE COURT:

Well, the City can do whatever

it feels it needs to do in terms of the property other
than 1067 North 750 West. My only concern is whether
or not --or what sentence will be imposed with
respect to that property and that property only.
MR. MCGINN:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: My objective in reviewing this
at the time of sentencing is to hear from both sides,
and I'll tell you, the language is clear with respect
to zoning, and the preferences to bring property into
compliance is found to be out.
If there is attempt to be made in the
sentencing of this case when we have the sentencing,
it will pertain to 1067 North 750 West, and I'm not
going to come in here and talk at the next date about
what's across the grass on the property on the other
side, because it has nothing to do with this case now
and we haven't heard any testimony on it.
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THE COURT:

Thank you.

Ms. Patton, I'd be happy to hear from you
first.
MS. PATTON:

In pre-trial conference, your

Honor, I had an opportunity to tell Mr. McGinn in
detail my feelings for why this has been (inaudible)
now I would like to tell you that I'm (inaudible).
The first case was actually -- just one
second, your Honor.
MR. HUMISTON:
THE COURT:

1987.

Maybe I can help, and you, Mr.

Humiston, on behalf of Mr. Patton.

Those other cases

really don't have much of an impact on me.

I've got a

case where my ruling was that they were guilty with
respect to Count I, and my question to you folks is,
what's going to be done to comply?
The fact that there was compliance or there
wasn't compliance with regard to other cases that were
handled by other judges is old news.

I'm really not

interested in rehashing all that stuff.
make any difference to me anymore.

It doesn't

You've all gone

through it, the City has gone through it, you folks
have gone through it, either complied or you didn't
comply.
Now we're starting over, and you're starting
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with this case with me.

My question to you is, what

do you have to say, if anything, with respect to the
sentencing on this case and the City's recommendation
as they've made it?
I don't want to talk about old cases, okay?
Now that should shorten things considerably.
MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:
MS. PATTON:

Can I put my objection in?
Objection to what?
I wanted to bring up my

mistrust for Provo City, and that was what I-THE COURT:

I'll tell you what, I think that

I've sensed that from the opening get-go of our trial
of your mistrust for Provo City, so you don't need to
tell me about it anymore.

I know that you don't trust

Provo City, but the fact is that there has been a
finding of guilt responsibility with respect to Count
I, and that's what I want to address now.
I have these other people sitting in the
back that are also entitled to have their day and to
resolve cases.

I'm not willing to compromise your

time for theirs, nor am I willing to compromise theirs
for yours.
I want to give everybody a fair opportunity
to be heard on all of their cases, but I would like
you to address your focus on this case and why we're

